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WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN
THE BANKING INDUSTRY
Robert H. Platt*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, employer-employee relations have increasingly come within
the purview of legislative regulation and judicial innovation. Parties to
employment contracts can no longer freely define their own relationships.'
Consequently, traditional employer-employee relationships have been rede-
fined.
Employee relations have been particularly affected by legislative and ju-
dicial intrusions on an employer's ability to discharge employees. Indeed,
until recently, courts considered the employer's right to terminate an em-
ployment contract for an indefinite term to be absolute.2 Today, significant
judicial inroads have steadily eroded the employment "at-will" rule. As a
result, disgruntled employees have obtained a potent litigation weapon.'
In the banking industry, however, the traditional employer-employee re-
lationship remains nearly intact. Within this particular sphere of business,
the at-will doctrine retains much of its vitality due to legislation passed at
the turn of the century. This legislation, which comprise the National Bank
* Robert H. Platt is an associate with the law firm of Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg,
Tunney & Phillips, Los Angeles, California; B.S., 1979, Cornell University School of Industrial
and Labor Relations; J.D., 1982, Fordham University School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Billy Rose for his contribution in the preparation of this article.
1. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)
(employment contracts are terminable only for good cause if either of two conditions exist: the
contract was supported by consideration independent of services performed for the employer,
or the parties agreed, expressly or impliedly, that the employment could be terminated only for
good cause).
2. See, e.g., Pirre v. Printing Devel., Inc., 432 F. Supp 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Martin v.
Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964); Boucher v. Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622,
178 A. 655 (1935); Martin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
3. See Cleary v. American Airlines, III Cal. App. 3d 433, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980)
(longevity of employment service and express policy of employer to provide specific procedures
for adjudicating employee disputes estopped plaintiff's discharge without good cause); Fortune
v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (written at-will employment
contract contains implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and termination must not
breach this covenant); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980) (employment for definite term exists when employer agrees to permanent employment
"as long as I did my job" and termination therefore can only be for good or just cause);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (employee at-will has
cause of action for wrongful discharge when discharge was contrary to clear, specific mandate
of public policy).
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Act,4 the Federal Reserve Act,5 and the Federal Home Loan Act, 6 collectively
known as the Bank Acts, allowed banks within the scope of the relevant
statutes to dismiss certain employees at pleasure without fear of common
law wrongful discharge suits.
Part I of this Article surveys the history of the at-will doctrine, Parts II
and III discuss the several legislative and judicial limitations that have
restricted the application of the at-will rule and upset the traditional em-
ployer-employee balance. Finally, Part IV focuses on the at-will rule as it
applies to the banking industry and the judicial attempts to erode the at-
will rule.
I. HISTORY OF THE AT-WILL RULE
The termination-at-will rule provides that either an employer or an em-
ployee may terminate a written or oral contractual arrangement for employ-
ment of indefinite duration at any time "with or without cause, for any
reason, however capricious and unfounded it might be."" The at-will doctrine
arose out of the increasing popularity of laissez-faire economics,' and gained
unquestioned adherence9 after it was first emphatically articulated in a late
nineteenth century treatise:
4. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1982).
5. Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 221 (1982).
6. Federal Home Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1421 (1982).
7. Fidelity & Gas Co. v. Gibson, 135 Ill. App. 290, 294, aff'd, 232 Ill. 49, 83 N.E. 539
(1908). Gibson is a common law example of judicial legislation that contributed to the evolution
of the at-will doctrine. See also Payne v. Western & A. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 520 (1884) (employer
may terminate at-will employee "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong"), rev'd on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915);
Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271, 273 (1975) (citing 59 cases from the 1950's and 1960's that enunciate
and adhere to the at-will doctrine).
8. See Note, Judicial Limitation of the Employment At- Will Doctrine, 54 ST. JOHN's L.
REV. 552, 555 (1980); Note, Tort Remedy for Retaliatory Discharge: Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act Limits Employer's Power to Discharge Employees Terminable-at-will-Kelsay
v. Motorola, Inc., 29 De Paul L. Rev. 561, 563 (1980).
9. See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 342, 346
(1974); Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEG. HIST.
118, 128 (1976). See also Boucher v. Godfrey, 119 Conn. 622, 178 A. 655 (1935) (either party
may terminate employment with or without cause if contract is for indefinite term); i.E.
Hanger, Inc. v. Fitzsimmons, 273 F. 348 (1921) (contract of employment without express or
implied duration provision is terminable at-will of either party); Wynne v. Ludman Corp., 79
So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1955) (no cause of action may be maintained for breach of employment
contract terminable by employer at any time); Crawford v. Stewart, 25 Hawaii 226 (1919) (a
hiring is for an indefinite term and terminable at-will when no facts can be proven to infer
that any particular time was contemplated by the parties), reh'g denied, 25 Hawaii 300 (1920);
Davis v. Davis, 197 Ind. 386, 151 N.E. 134 (1926) (no cause of action when agreement lacks
mutuality because it did not specify pay rate or hours to be worked by employee); Drake v.
Block, 247 Iowa 517, 74 N.W.2d 577 (1956) (oral contracts indefinite as to period of employment
terminable by employer at-will); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Wells, 289 Ky. 700, 160 S.W.2d
[Vol. 34:971
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[Tlhe rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the
burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day,
week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring and
no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate
fixed for whatever time the party may serve. 0
The laissez-faire economic theory that spawned the at-will doctrine has
since subsided.' Yet, the at-will rule still prevails 2 and remains the law in
most jurisdictions. 3 Today, however, proponents defend the at-will doctrine
16 (1942) (contract is terminable at-will of employee when contract does not obligate employee
to work for a definite time period); Pechon v. National Corp. Serv., Inc., 234 La. 397, 100
So. 2d 213 (1958) (employment contract was for indefinite period of time and terminable at
the will of either party); Blaisdell v. Lewis, 32 Me. 515 (1851).
10. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877).
II. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937); Blades, Employment
At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1416-18 (1967).
12. See, e.g., Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271 (1975):
[Flew legal principles would seem to be better settled than the broad generality that
an employment for an indefinite term is regarded as an employment at-will which
may be terminated at any time by either party for any reason or for no reason at
all.
Id. at 271. See also White v. Chelsea, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. 1983) (employment at-will
existed when there was no agreement specifying employment duration or limiting employer's
right to terminate); Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 35 Colo. App. 1, 530 P.2d 984 (1974)
(contract silent as to duration term terminable at-will); Davis v. Hospital Auth., 167 Ga. App.
304, 306 S.E.2d 306 (1983) (employer had absolute authority to terminate plaintiff's employ-
ment); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977) (employee could
not maintain wrongful discharge claim without showing infringement on public policy because
contract was for employment at-will); Harper v. Cedar Rapids Television Co., 244 N.W.2d 782
(Iowa 1976) (employment contract at the time of discharge contained indefinite duration and
was terminable at-will).
13. See Forde v. Royal's, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Bender Ship Repair,
Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980); Builders Supply Corp. v. Shipley, 86 Ariz. 153,
341 P.2d 940 (1959); Miller v. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 225 Ark. 475, 283 S.W.2d 158
(1955); Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 35 Colo. App. I, 530 P.2d 984 (1974); Taylor v.
Greenway Restaurant, Inc., 173 A.2d 211 (D.C. 1961); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga.
612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978); Harper v. Cedar Rapids Tel. Co., 244 N.W.2d 782 (Iowa 1976);
Mildfelt v. Lair, 221 Kan. 557, 561 P.2d 805 (1977); Pechon v. National Corp. Service, Inc.,
234 La. 397, 100 So. 2d 213 (1958); Rape v. Mobile & 0. R.R. Co., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So.
585 (1924); Eib v. Federal Reserve Bank, 633 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. App. 1982); State v. Employers
of Labor, 102 Neb. 768, 169 N.W. 717 (Neb. 1918); Brooks v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 56
N.C. App. 801, 290 S.E.2d 370 (1982); Wood v. Buchanan, 72 N.D. 216, 5 N.W.2d 680 (1942);
Brown v. Toledo Mental Hygiene Clinic, 63 Ohio App. 2d 192, 410 N.E.2d 1262 (1978); Sooner
Broadcasting Co. v. Grotkop, 280 P.2d 457 (Okla. 1955); Rotondo v. Seaboard Foundry, 440
A.2d 751 (R.I. 1981); Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 276 S.C. 284, 278
S.E.2d 607 (1981); Little v. Federal Container Corp., 61 Tenn. App. 26, 452 S.W.2d 875 (1969);
Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603
P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); Kovachik v. American Auto Ass'n., 5 Wis. 2d 188, 92 N.W.2d 254
(1958); Lukens v. Goit, 430 P.2d 607 (Wyo. 1967); see also 9 S. Williston, A Treatise on the
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based on the concept of mutuality-"the employer and the employee remain
free to continue or to terminate an employment relationship as each de-
sires. "14
II. LEGISLATIVE LIMITATIONS ON THE AT-WILL RULE
Courts were initially hostile to legislative efforts to interfere with the right
of employers and employees to freely contract for their terms of employment.
In Adair v. United States,'5 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a
federal statute that prohibited employers from discharging employees because
of their organization of, or membership in, labor unions. In doing so, the
Court stated, "it is not within the functions of government-at least in the
absence of contract between the parties-to compel any person, in the course
of his business and against his will, to accept or retain the personal services
of another .... ,16
As laissez-faire economics gradually fell into disfavor, however, Congress
again attempted to balance the bargaining power between employers and
employees. Thus, recognizing "[tihe inequality of bargaining between em-
ployees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the 'corporate or other forms
of ownership association,"" Congress passed the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 (LMRA).1s This time the Supreme Court upheld the
protective legislation observing that such legislation was necessary because
"a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer."' 9
More recently, federal legislation has been enacted to preclude application
of the at-will rule to individuals terminated because of age,20 physical disa-
bility,2 race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.22 Moreover, the Con-
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1017 (3d ed. 1967); 56 C.J.S., Master and Servant § 8 (1948 and Supp.
1984); see, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1984):
An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either
party on notice to the other .... Employment for a specified term means an
employment for a period greater than one month.
Id. For a comprehensive study of the history of the at-will doctrine, see Feinman, supra note
9.
14. Vernon and Gray, Termination at Will-The Employer's Right to Fire, 6 EMP. REL.
L.J. 25 (1981).
15. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
16. Id. at 174. See also Coppage v. State of Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (holding similar
state legislation unconstitutional).
17. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
18. Id.
19. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1937).
20. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982); see also
Executive Order 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1964) (prohibiting federal contractors from discriminating
based on age).
21. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982) (amended version).
22. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982); see
also Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965) (prohibiting race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin discrimination by federal contractors).
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sumer Credit Protection Act23 prohibits employers from discharging employees
because their wages have been subjected to garnishment, 24 and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act25 disallows the termination of female employees "because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. '26
Federal law now also prohibits termination of the employment relationship
because of military status 27 or jury duty. 28 In addition, Congress has passed
numerous "anti-reprisal" provisions that prohibit employers from discharg-
ing employees for reporting violations of, or asserting rights under, several
health, safety, environmental protection, and individual rights laws.2 9
III. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON THE AT-WILL RULE
Courts have also recently scrutinized the at-will doctrine, and have
continually strained to avoid what they perceived to be inequitable employee
terminations. In the process, courts have utilized the following independent
legal theories to avoid application of the at-will rule: (a) the tort of wrongful
discharge, (b) breach of an express or implied contract, and (c) breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
26. Id.
27. Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1982).
28. Jury System Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1982) (protection of jurors' employ-
ment).
29. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301, 2302, 7102, 7116 (1982); Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1982); Asbestos School Hazard Detection and
Control Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3608 (1982); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3) (1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982); Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982); Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1855(a) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (19.82); Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1293 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (1982); Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(d) (1982); Energy Reorganization Act
Amendment of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1982); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971
(1982); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1982); Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (1982); Railroad
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982); Federal Railroad Safety Act Amendment, 45
U.S.C. § 441 (1982); International Safe Container Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1506 (1982).
Most state legislatures have followed Congress' lead, and have occasionally gone further than
their federal counterpart in circumscribing the at-will rule. See, e.g., California Fair Employment
and Housing Act, CAL. Gov'T. CODE §§ 12,900-12,966 (West 1981) (forbidding discharge of
employees because of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, mental
condition, marital status, sex, or age); Discharge for Refusal to Assign Rights to Invention,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2871 (West 1981) (employment agreement providing for the assignment of
rights as a condition is prohibited); Requiring Polygraph Test as Condition of Employment,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1981); Discharge For Refusal to Provide Fingerprints or
Photographs. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1051 (West 198 1) (misdemeanor to use fingerprints and photographs
provided for employment to the detriment of the employee).
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A. The Tort of Wrongful Discharge
Numerous courts have recently developed and applied a tort exception to
the at-will rule. 30 This tort exception allows an employee to bring suit for
the tort of wrongful discharge if the termination violated "public policy."
The California Court of Appeal first articulated the public policy theory in
the seminal case of Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters.3
In Petermann, the plaintiff was a business agent employed by the Teamsters.
The plaintiff alleged that the Teamsters discharged him for disobeying union
instructions to give false testimony before a state committee that was inves-
tigating union hiring hall operations." The appellate court reversed the trial
court, and noted that a contract lacking a fixed duration term is "terminable
at the will of either party ... for any reason whatsoever." 33 The court
concluded, however, that the unfettered right of discharge "may be limited
by statute.. .or by considerations of public policy." ' 3' While acknowledging that
"[tihe term 'public policy' is inherently not subject to precise definition,"" the
Petermann court declared:
[Iln order to more fully effectuate the State's declared policy against
perjury, the civil law . . .must deny the employer his generally unlimited
right to discharge an employee whose employment is for an unspecified
duration, when reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit
perjury.16
When several courts followed Petermann's lead in utilizing the public
policy theory,3 7 practitioners and employers initially feared that this exception
30. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983); Perry v. Hartz Mountain
Corp., 537 F. Supp 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167,
610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn.
471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182
(Fla. 1983); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Jackson
v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Adler v. American Standard
Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Trombetta v. Detroit, Tol. & I. R.R., 81 Mich. App.
489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978); Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980); Cloutier
v. Greater At. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super.
416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler
& Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W.
Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
31. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
32. Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
33. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 26.
36. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 27.
37. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980) (discharge of employee for refusal to participate in illegal price-fixing scheme
against public policy); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13
Cal. Rptr 769 (1961) (discharge of employee for signing union membership application violates
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to the at-will rule would greatly impinge upon an employer's ability to make
efficient business decisions. The floodgates appeared to be opened to tenuous
wrongful discharge claims. Shortly thereafter, dismissed employees began
challenging an employer's right to terminate for reasons such as refusing to
get a haircut,3" criticizing an employer's employment policies,3 9 announcing
an intention to attend law school, 40 refusing to take a psychological stress
evaluation test, 4' and refusing to continue a project an employee viewed as
unethical. 42 Employees sought protection from allegedly wrongful discharges
based on their own perceptions of public policy. In response, many courts
severely limited the public policy exception by circumscribing it primarily to
violations of policy expressly stated by statute. 43 For example, in Parnar v.
Americana Hotels, Inc., 44 the Hawaii Supreme Court acknowledged the
difficulty of applying the public policy exception without the guidance of a
statutory admonition, and expressed the need to limit the exception:
In view of the somewhat vague meaning of the term "public policy," few
courts have been inclined to apply the public policy exception absent a
violation of statute or clearly defined policy. These decisions manifest a
reluctance of courts to unjustifiably intrude on the employment arrange-
ment or to arrogate to themselves the perceived legislative function of
declaring public policy.'4
Nevertheless, courts have since expanded the public policy exception during
the last few years to include discharges for "whistle blowing,'' 46 performing
public policy); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)
(dismissal of employee for filing workers compensation claim against public policy); Nees v.
Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge of employee for serving on jury duty
against public policy); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965) (discharge of
employees for union membership violated public policy and statute).
38. Page Airways v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 50 A.D.2d 83, 376 N.Y.S.2d
32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 877, 352 N.E.2d 140, 386 N.Y.S.2d 223 ('976).
39. Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. App. 1980).
40. Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977).
41. Larson v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977).
42. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
43. Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels,
Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 379-80, 652 P.2d 625, 630-31 (1982); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co.,
260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich.
692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965).
44. 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1983)
45. Id. at 379, 652 P.2d at 630-31; see also Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d
1130 (Ala. 1977) (public policy exception "too vague" to overturn at-will rule)
46. "Whistle blowing" by an employee is the reporting of an unlawful act. See Parnar v.
Americana Hotels, 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Palmateer v. International Harvester,
85 IlI. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d
270 (1978). Cf. Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981) (employee
allegedly dismissed for testifying at an administrative proceeding; however, appeal denied
because case did not state a claim); Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251
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statutory duties such as serving jury duty, 47 and retaliation for filing workers'
compensation claims 48 and claims under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act.49 The exercise of judicial restraint, however, should encourage courts
to defer to the legislature to determine what constitutes a discharge in
violation of public policy. The public policy exception to the at-will rule will
otherwise continue to expand in scope and thereby impede the rights of
employers to make independent business decisions.
B. Express or Implied Contract
An increasing number of courts have recognized a second major exception
to the at-will rule-the breach of an express or implied contract.5 0 Employers'
personnel policies and employee manuals may create implied contracts that
limit employers' right to discharge." Courts have similarly held that oral
S.E.2d 51 (1978) (employee terminable at-will when termination due to fact that he was about
to uncover criminal activities, which is not statutory); Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d
1054 (Ind. App. 1980) (no binding promise between employer and employee to avoid discharge
at-will, and assuming there was, public policy permitted termination for reporting negligent
acts); Adler v American Standard Co., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (although cause of
action exists when termination violates public policy, employee's excessively vague complaint
failed to allege any public policy violations).
47. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,
255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
48. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 III. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Murphy v. City of
Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Serv., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981);
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675
P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); Brown v.
Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978).
49. Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982). Cf. Ohlsen v.
DST Indus., Ill Mich. App. 580, 314 N.W.2d 699 (1981) (employee's OSHA suit barred for
failure to exhaust all administrative remedies).
50. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Martin
v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Il1. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1982); Terrio v. Millinocket
Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich.
579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. App. 1983). Cf.
Horizon Corp. v. Weinberg, 23 Ariz. App. 215, 531 P.2d 1153 (1975) (advertisement described
employment as "permanent," but did not create definite duration term, and therefore terminable
at-will); Hamlen v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 413 So. 2d 800 (Fla. App. 1982) (indefinite general
hiring contract for permanent employment is terminable at-will); Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc.,
416 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 1982) (absent specific duration term in employment, contract right
to terminate at-will exists).
51. Serafin v. City of Lexington, 547 F. Supp. 1118 (D. Neb. 1982), aff'd, 716 F.2d 909
(8th Cir. 1983); Walker v. North San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 3d 896, 185
Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982); Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977);
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Arie v.
Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. App. 1983); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196
Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982); Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, 98 N.M.
125, 645 P.2d 1381 (1982); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1982); Dangott v. ASG Indus., 558 P.2d 379 (Okla. 1976); Simpson v. Western Graphics
1985] WRONGFUL TERMINATION 979
representations made to employees at interviews5 2 or during their employment"
may create contractual obligations. Conversely, some courts have also held
that when employers expressly incorporate at-will language into written
personnel manuals or policies, it creates a contractual right for employers
to terminate employees at-will.14
Thus, written or oral representations made to employees or prospective
employees may create enforceable contracts that limit an employer's right
to terminate employees at-will.
C. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The third, and least recognized exception to the at-will doctrine, is a cause
of action-for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
To date, only a few jurisdictions, led by California, have recognized the
existence of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts." The vast majority of jurisdictions have declined to recognize this
covenant 56
Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn.
App. 1981). Cf. Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 609
F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1979) (failure to follow company personnel policy did not create a cause of
action for breach of employment contract); Heideck v. Kent General Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d
1095 (Del. 1982) (employment at-will where employee agreed that she was not hired under
written contract, that employer never orally promised employment for definite term, and that
she did not feel bound to work for a fixed term); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220
Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 1982).
52. Forman v. BRI Corp., 532 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
53. Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Rabago-Alvarez v.
Dart Indus. Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976); Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
54. Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo
Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984); Hillsman v. Sutter Community
Hosp., 153 Cal. App. 3d 743, 200 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1984).
55. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980);
Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 429 A.2d 492 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980); Fortune v. National Cash
Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,
316 A.2d 549 (1974).
56. Walker v. Modern Realty, 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1982) (under Missouri law courts
will not imply an obligation of good faith into employment contracts unless legislature created
the obligation); Hunter v. H.D. Lee Co., 563 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (no implied
convenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts under Kansas law); Scholtes
v. Signal Delivery Serv., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (Arkansas will not imply convenant
of good faith and fair dealing in every employment contract); Payne v. AHFI/Netherlands,
B.V., 522 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. I11. 1980) (employer in Illinois owes no duty of good faith and
fair dealing in employment contracts); Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d
907 (Ct. App. 1977) (no obligation of good faith and fair dealing incorporated into employment
contracts); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978) (no
covenant to deal fairly with employees imputed in employment contracts); Catania v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. App. 1980) (no cause of action for violation by employer
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Jurisdictions that do recognize a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in employment contracts interpret the covenant as an implicit promise by
the parties to act in good faith towards one another. Indeed, in Seaman's
Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil of California,57 the California
Supreme Court recently held that a breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contracts may entitle a plaintiff to tort
remedies for punitive damages. 8
In California, an aggrieved individual's ability to state a cognizable cause
of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts is restricted. In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,19
the California Court of Appeals explained that "the longevity of the em-
ployee's service, together with the expressed [grievance] policy of the em-
ployer, operate as a form of estoppel . . . ." Subsequent California decisions
interpreted Cleary to hold that only an aggrieved employee who has longevity
of service and has relied on an expressed grievance policy articulated in an
employer's policy manual can maintain a cause of action based on a breach
of the covenant. Accordingly, California courts routinely dismiss claims for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when an employee is
not a long term employee, 6° or when the termination is not in derogation of
of obligation of good faith and fair dealing); Gunn v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 162 Ga. App.
474, 291 S.E.2d 779 (1982) (no implied requirement that employer terminate its employees in
good faith); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982) (requirement of
good faith is not part of every contract; otherwise judiciary would need to supervise the
discharge of every employee); Griffith v. Sollay Found. Drilling, 373 So. 2d 979 (La. App.
1979) (no just cause requirement in employment contracts); Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102
Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981) ("even an arbitrary and capricious discharge is not
actionable under a contract terminable at will"); Reiter v. Yellowstone County, 627 P.2d 845
(1981) (18 year employment does not create implied covenant of good faith, and changes in at-
will rule must be made by legislature); Murphy v. American Home Prod., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448
N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) ("incongruous" to argue that employer impliedly agreed
to covenant of good faith and fair dealing; this would destroy employer's termination rights);
Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. App. 1981) (nurse discharged without
cause did not state cause of action for bad faith termination; Tennessee law does not recognize
this cause of action, and any change in the law must come from legislature or state supreme
court); Watson v. Zep Mfg., 582 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (employer has no duty of
good faith in discharging employee absent legislative mandate); Mann v. American W. Life
Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978) (no requirement that employer have good cause for
termination).
57. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
58. Id. at 756 n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358 n.6. See also Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal.
App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984) (breach of contract providing for payments to laid-
off employee creates tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress by former
employer.)
59. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 733 (1980).
60. Cf. Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985). In
Khanna, a California Court of Appeals recently held, for the first time, that longevity of service
and an employer acting contrary to an expressed grievance policy are not always required
elements to allege a cause of action for breach of the covenant. Khanna specifically held that
a cause of.action for breach of the covenant is established whenever an employer engages in
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an employer's established grievance procedure. 61
IV. THE BANKING ACTS
A. Coverage and Intent
The three exceptions to the at-will rule have virtually emasculated the
doctrine in many jurisdictions. Consequently, in the last few years banks
have resurrected longstanding legislation that regulates the banking industry
and expressly preserves the at-will doctrine. 62 The Bank Acts-the National
Bank Act, the Federal Reserve Act, and the Federal Home Loan Act-each
embody in explicit terms a legislative intent to advance the at-will doctrine
in the banking industry.
All three Bank Acts provide that certain bank employees can be "dis-
miss[ed] at pleasure ' 63 by a bank's board of directors. The National Bank
Act provides for the "at pleasure" dismissal of the "president, vice president,
cashier, and other officers." '  The "dismissal at pleasure" authority is
extended in the Federal Reserve Act to include not only the president, vice-
president and other officers, but also other "employees. '65 The Federal
"bad faith action extraneous to the contract, combined with the [employer's] intent to frustrate
the [employee's] enjoyment of contract rights." Id. at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
61. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (32 years
sufficient longevity to state cause of action); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., I I I Cal. App.
3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (18 years sufficient longevity to state cause of action);
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980)
(15 years sufficient longevity to state cause of action); cf. Scopas v. Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc., 114 L.R.R.M. 2933 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (four and one-half years insufficient longevity to
state cause of action); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 282, 219 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1985) (seven years falls short of the necessary longevity to state a cause of action); Newfield
v. Insurance Co., 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1984) (less than two years is
insufficient longevity to state cause of action); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152
Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984) (three and one-half years is insufficient longevity
to state cause of action).
62. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1982); Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 221
(1982); Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1421 (1982).
63. 12 U.S.C. § 24, par. 5 (1982); id. § 341, par. 5; id. § 1432(a).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 24, par. 5 (1982). Section 24 provides:
A national banking association .. .shall have power-
Fifth. To elect or appoint directors, and by its board of directors to appoint a
president, vice-president, cashier, and other officers, define their duties, require bonds
of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them at pleasure,
and appoint others to fill their places.
65. 12 U.S.C. § 341, par. 5 (1982). Section 341 provides:
A Federal reserve bank .. .shall have power-
Fifth. To appoint by its board of directors a president, vice presidents, and such
officers and employees as are not otherwise provided for in this chapter, to define
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Home Loan Act utilizes even broader language, and in addition to including
those employees enumerated in the preceding acts, gives banks authority to
dismiss at pleasure "attorneys and agents." 66
The National Bank Act governs associations that are certified by the
Comptroller of the Currency as national banking institutions. 67 Today, all
such banks must include the word "National" in their title. 6a The Federal
Reserve Act governs the twelve federal reserve banks in the United States, 69
and the Federal Home Loan Act governs the twelve banks established by
the Federal Home Bank Board.70 Both the Federal Reserve Act and the
Federal Home Loan Act, however, are unclear as to whether "member
banks""' are also entitled to utilize the "dismissal at pleasure" language in
the acts. To date, no court has clarified this issue.
The inclusion of explicit at-will language in the Bank Acts reflect Congres-
sional concern that federally chartered banks would be unnecessarily re-
their duties, require bonds for them and fix the penalty thereof, and to dismiss at
pleasure such officers or employees.
In Obradovich v. Federal Reserve Bank, 569 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York examined the scope of the term "em-
ployee." The court held that the legislative history of the Federal Reserve Act indicated that
"Congress deliberately chose to use the broad term 'employees' in the dismiss at-pleasure
provision rather than limit its application to officers or high level professionals or executives."
Id. at 790 n.17. The Obradovich court thus concluded that a painter in the maintenance
department of a bank, whose duties did "not seem essential to the Federal Reserve's discharge
of its financial responsibilities" could nonetheless be dismissed at-pleasure. Id; see also Little
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 601 F. Supp. 1372 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (security guard is employee
under Federal Reserve Act). Obradovich is cited in Little v. Federal Reserve Bank, 601 F. Supp.
1374 (N.D. Ohio 1985), which held that there was no violation of due process in the at-will
discharge of a bank guard. Note that the term "employee" does not appear in the National
Banking Act. Thus, lower-level employees of national banks may still arguably state a cause
of action for wrongful discharge; cf. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va.
1978) (former at-will bank manager of consumer credit stated proper cause of action for
intentional and outrageous infliction of emotional distress by alleging discharge in retaliation
of compliance with consumer credit protection laws); see also Case v. First Nat'l Bank, 59
Misc. 269, 109 N.Y.S. 1119 (Sup. Ct. 1908) (a "solicitor of business" is not an officer under
the National Bank Act).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1982). Section 1432(a) provides: "[the bank shall have the power]
to select, employ, and fix the compensation of such officers, employees, attorneys, and agents
.. . and to dismiss at pleasure such officers employees, attorneys, and agents ....
67. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 35 (1982).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 22 (1982).
69. 12 U.S.C. § 221 (1982).
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1422 (1982); 12 C.F.R. 500.32 (1985).
71. The Federal Reserve Act provides: "Wherever the word "bank" is used in this chapter,
the word shall be held to include State Bank, banking association, and trust company, except
where national banks or Federal reserve banks are specifically referred to."
12 U.S.C. § 221 (1982) states:
The term "member bank" is described as any national bank, State bank, or bank
or trust company which has become a member of one of the Federal reserve banks.
Id. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act defines "member" as "any institution which has
subscribed for the stock of a Federal Home Loan Bank." 12 U.S.C. § 1422 (1982).
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stricted in discharging their financial responsibilities if they could not dismiss
certain employees at pleasure." Indeed, in Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher,7 an
early case construing the National Bank Act, the Eighth Circuit amply
highlighted the policy behind providing a bank board of directors with the
unfettered authority of dismissal:
The act of congress expressly fixed the tenure of office of the cashier of
this bank .... It provided that this cashier should always hold his office
subject to instantaneous removal at the pleasure of the board of directors.
Nor is it at all probable that this provision of the national bank act was
inserted without purpose or consideration. Observation and experience
alike teach that it is essential to the safety and prosperity of banking
institutions that the active officers, to whose integrity and discretion the
moneys and property of the bank and its customers are intrusted, should
be subject to immediate removal whenever the suspicion of faithlessness
or negligence attaches to them . . . It sometimes happens that, without
any justification, a suspicion of dishonesty or carelessness attaches to a
cashier or a president of a bank, spreads through the community in which
he lives, scares the depositors, and threatens immediate financial ruin to
the institution. In such a case it is necessary to the prosperity and success-
to the very existence-of a banking institution that the board of directors
should have power to remove such an officer, and to put in his place
another, in whom the community has confidence .. .
The dismissal-at-pleasure language in the Bank Acts remained virtually
untested until the common law right of employers to discharge at-will
fell into judicial disfavor. Courts typically dealt with these claims sum-
marily when faced with litigation under the dismissal-at-pleasure lan-
guage in the Bank Acts. 7 For example, in Copeland v. Melrose National
72. See Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118, 122 (8th Cir. 1896) (applying National
Bank Act); cf. Armano v. Federal Reserve Bank, 468 F. Supp. 674, 676 (D. Mass. 1979)
(applying the Federal Reserve Act); Copeland v. Melrose Nat'l Bank, 229 App. Div. 311-12,
241 N.Y.S. 429, 431 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 254 N.Y. 632, 173 N.E. 898 (1930) (applying the
National Bank Act); Darrah v. Wheeling Ice & Storage Co., 50 W. Va. 417, 418, 40 S.E. 373,
373 (1901) (applying similarly worded state statute to corporate practice).
73. 76 F. 118 (8th Cir. 1896).
74. Id. at 122. Almost 90 years later, Kemper v. First Nat'l Bank, 94 I11. App. 3d 169, 418
N.E.2d 819 (1981), questioned the vitality of the policy underlying the National Bank Act. The
plaintiff in Kemper was a dismissed bank president. The plaintiff argued that the policy, as
enunciated by Westervelt, was outdated. The plaintiff contended that the Act was designed to
protect bank customers in the days before federal deposit insurance, and therefore had no place
in the modern banking industry, which needs to be able to offer certain employment prospects
in order to attract management personnel of high quality. 94 Ill. App. 3d at 171, 418 N.E.2d
at 821. The Kemper court, however, observed "that Congress has amended other portions of
Section 24, Title 12 numerous times, without altering paragraph 5 ... [and therefore] decline[d]
plaintiff's invitation to reconsider the policy implications of the law." Id. at 172, 418 N.E.2d
at 821.
75. Rankin v. Tygard, 198 F. 795 (8th Cir. 1912) (bank president's contractually fixed term
determined only an outer limit of employment and employer could still remove at pleasure);
Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118, 122 (8th Cir. 1896) ("neither the bank nor its board
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Bank,16 a bank vice-president brought suit for breach of a three-year
employment contract that provided for liquidated damages if he was
prematurely dismissed. The Copeland court relied upon the National Bank
Act, and stated that "a contract for a definite term which forbids dis-
charge [at-pleasure] except under penalty of paying compensation for
the full term violates the statute, and is unenforceable. '"77
Thereafter, the dismissal-at-pleasure language of the Banking Acts laid
dormant. For nearly forty years, there was no litigation challenging a bank's
common law and statutory authority to dismiss at-will. With the statutory
and judicial erosion of an employer's ability to dismiss at-will, however, a
resurrection of the dismissal-at-pleasure provisions in the Bank Acts occurred.
Suddenly, lawyers began to dust off the Bank Acts and use them as potent
weapons against common law claims for wrongful discharge, breach of
express and implied contracts, and breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Bank Acts
After modern courts began to erode the at-will doctrine, the first case to
address the utilization of the Bank Acts as a defense to a wrongful termi-
nation lawsuit was decided by the California Court of Appeal. In Kozlowsky
v. Westminster National Bank,7s decided in 1970, the plaintiff, a national
bank president, was terminated during the term of his one-year written
can make contracts or appointments in violation of that (at-pleasure] provision"); Cox v.
First Nat'l Bank, 10 Cal. App. 2d 302, 52 P.2d 524 (1935) (cashier's contract with national
bank for definite period with fixed salary void, does not prevent removal at any time by board
of directors, and will not support action for damages for discharge nor permit recovery of
salary accruing after discharge); First Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 23 Ga. App. 441, 98 S.E. 402
(1919) (because bank board of directors had no authority to employ plaintiff-cashier for fixed
term, cashier had no cause of action); First Nat'l Bank v. Briggs' Assignees, 69 Vt. 12, 37 A.
231 (1894) (under National Bank Act no liability for discharge notwithstanding contractual
arrangement to the contrary).
Perhaps the earliest case to comment on the meaning of the "at pleasure" language of the
National Bank Act was Harrington v. First Nat'l Bank, I N.Y. Sup. Ct. 361 (1873), in which
the court noted that a national bank could not make a contract with an officer such that the
directors would be deprived of their ability to discharge at-will. This was essentially dictum,
however, since the court found that there was sufficient cause to justify the cashier's dismissal,
and that the ability of the employer to discharge for cause was an implied contract term.
For additional authority, see Kemper v. First Nat'l Bank, 94 IIl. App. 3d 169, 418 N.E.2d
819 (1981) (following interpretation of National Bank Act in Rankin, 198 F. 785 (8th Cir.
1912)); Van Slyke v. Andrews, 146 Minn. 316, 178 N.W. 959 (1920) (national banking law
expressly permits board of directors to remove officers at any time).
76. 229 A.D. 311, 241 N.Y.S. 429 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 254 N.Y. 632, 173 N.E. 898
(1930).
77. Id. at 312-13, 241 N.Y.S. 429-30.
78. 6 Cal. App. 3d 593, 86 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1970).
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employment contract. 79 The plaintiff's complaint alleged causes of action for
breach of contract, deceit, and interference with contractual relations. The
bank argued that the National Bank Act empowered it to dismiss the
president at pleasure. The court held that the "provision [in the National
Bank Act] that the board of directors may dismiss officers at pleasure, ...
has been construed as overriding any contract to employ for a fixed term. ' 's"
The court concluded that "[b]y virtue of this statute the board may dismiss
an officer without liability for breach of the agreement to employ."',
Likewise, in McGeehan v. Bank of New Hampshire, National Associa-
tion,8 2 an executive vice-president of a national bank was terminated during
the term of a one-year contract of employment. The terms of the employment
contract specifically provided that the bank could terminate the plaintiff's
employment during the one-year term "only if he [was] convicted of a
criminal act." 3 Nevertheless, the bank terminated the vice-president before
the one-year agreement expired even though he had not been convicted of
a criminal act. The plaintiff subsequently alleged wrongful termination,
breach of contract, and tortious interference with his employment contract.8 4
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the judgment of the lower
court, and held that the National Bank Act "renders] unenforceable, as
against public policy, all contractual provisions which do not allow a national
banking association to discharge its officers at will without incurring liability
for breach of contract." 85
Courts have reached similar results under the Federal Reserve Act. In
Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,16 the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco had employed the plaintiff for eleven years as a
regulatory attorney. The plaintiff alleged that the bank fired him for un-
covering a potentially illegal regulatory activity on the part of the bank and
the Federal Reserve Board,8 7 and brought breach of contract, constitutional,
and tort claims against the bank and several of its officers.88
79. Id. at 596, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
80. Id. at 596, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
81. Id. at 596-97, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 54. The court noted, however, that a discharged employee
could still attempt to state an action for interference with contractual relations. Id. at 598, 86
Cal. Rptr. at 55. See also Kemper v. Worcester, 106 I11. App. 3d 121, 435 N.E.2d 827 (1982)
(employment agreement, although terminable at-will, constituted sufficient relationship upon
which to base cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relations).
82. 123 N.H. 83, 455 A.2d 1054 (1983). See also Alfano v. First Nat'l Bank, 490 N.Y.S.2d
56 (1985) (National Bank Act renders unenforceable employment contract between officers and
national banks).
83. 123 N.H. at 85, 455 A.2d at 1055.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 650 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1981)
87. Id. at 1096.
88. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, and held
that the Federal Reserve Act preempted California common law remedies
for breach of contract.8 9 The court denied plaintiff any relief and stated:
By promising Bollow [the plaintiff] employment security in excess of that
provided for by section Four, Fifth, [defendant] clearly overstepped the
bounds of his authority under that section .... Thus, any contract which
might have been created ... is void and unenforceable against the Bank.-°
Further, in Armano v. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 9' the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston allegedly terminated an employee in contravention
of certain personnel policies and practices that the plaintiff claimed estab-
lished an employment contract with the Federal Reserve Bank. 92 The plaintiff
sought damages for breach of the alleged employment contract and for
severe emotional distress. 93 The trial judge held that "assuming . . . that
such personnel rules and practices would otherwise constitute a binding
employment contract, I rule such a contract is void and unenforceable under
the Federal Reserve Act . . . . 94 The court reasoned:
Clearly, a contract that binds the Bank by requiring just cause for dismissal
prevents the Bank from exercising its express power to dismiss an employee
at pleasure. By that provision, Congress clearly sought to protect Federal
reserve banks from unnecessary restrictions in carrying out their financial
responsibility. Neither the Act's express powers nor incidental powers
thereto authorized federal reserve banks to bind themselves in employment
contracts."
Jaffee v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago96 and Obradovich v. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York also reached similar results. 97 The plaintiffs in
both Jaffee and Obradovich alleged that certain employment policies and
rules established by their respective banks created employment contracts that
should have barred their respective terminations. The courts held in both
cases that the "dismiss at pleasure" language in the Federal Reserve Act
renders void and unenforceable any employment contract that contains
contrary provisions.98
Discharged employees have met with similar results after bringing common
law causes of action against banks protected by the Federal Home Loan
Act. In Inglis v. Feinerman,99 a bank terminated an employee without a
89. Id. at 1098.
90. Id. at 1099.
91. 468 F. Supp. 674 (D. Mass. 1979).
92. Id. at 675.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 676.
96. 586 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. III. 1984).
97. 569 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
98. Id. at 790; 586 F.Supp. at 107-08.
99. 701 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984).
[Vol. 34:971
WRONGFUL TERMINATION
disciplinary hearing as provided for in the bank's personnel manual.' °° The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial
court, and held that "attempts to create employment rights from independent
sources such as the employment manual are void under the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act."'' 0
In the wake of the cases decided under the dismissal-at-pleasure language
of the Bank Acts, banks covered by the acts apparently have unfettered
discretion to terminate certain employees without fear of reprisal. Neverthe-
less, certain courts have made judicial incursions into these statutory man-
dates.
C. Judicial Erosion of the Bank Acts
Notwithstanding the clear dicate of the Bank Acts, which allow covered
banks to dismiss certain employees at pleasure, some courts have bent over
backwards to erode this directive. In Mahoney v. Crocker National Bank," 2
the named plaintiffs brought an action on behalf of themselves and those similarly
situated. The plaintiffs alleged age discrimination, wrongful discharge, breach
of implied employment contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.° 3 The bank contended that the National Bank Act preempted
plaintiffs' state law claims, and therefore no liability could attach.'04 The
court, strictly construing the National Bank Act, observed that since the
statute empowered a board of directors to appoint and dismiss officers, a
bank could not exercise its power to dismiss officers at pleasure unless the
board itself, or its duly authorized delegate, approved the appointment and
dismissal of the officers. 05
The Mahoney court held that the board of directors of a bank need not
have directly appointed or dismissed the named plaintiffs.'06 The court noted
that in the National Bank Act, "section 24, Sixth provides the board with
the power to enact by-laws regulating the manner in which officers shall be
appointed."''0 7 The court further observed that the by-laws of the bank
provided that officers of the bank "may be appointed by the Board of
Directors or the Chairman of the Board or by such person or persons as
100. 701 F.2d at 98-99.
101. Id. at 99.
102. 571 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
103. Id. at 288.
104. Id. at 289.
105. Id. at 290-91.
106. Id. at 290.
107. Id. 12 U.S.C. § 24, par. 6 provides:
Sixth. To prescribe, by its board of directors, by-laws not inconsistent with law,
regulating the manner in which its stock shall be transferred, its directors elected
or appointed, its officers appointed, its property transferred, its general business
conducted, and the privileges granted to it by law exercised and enjoyed.
12 U.S.C. § 24, par. 6 (1982) (emphasis added).
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the Board may designate."' 8 Because the board of directors had approved
the appointments of the named plaintiffs, the court held that the bank had
therefore made the appointments in accordance with the bank's by-laws.3 9
The Mahoney court then examined whether the named plaintiffs had been
discharged in accordance with the National Bank Act. The court noted that
Section 24, Sixth, of the National Bank Act provides that the board of
directors of a national bank may prescribe by-laws that regulate the manner
in which "its general business [shall be] conducted, and the privileges granted
to it by law exercised and enjoyed.""10 The court also examined the regu-
lations of the National Bank Act, which further provide that "the board of
directors of a national bank may not delegate responsibility but may assign
the performance thereof."'" The Mahoney court, relying on the statute itself
and the regulations promulgated thereunder, held that:
Congress therefore has empowered boards of directors of national banks
and the persons to whom the board of directors assign the performance
of making dismissals with the right to dismiss officers at pleasure. Where
dismissals are made by the entities or persons empowered to dismiss at
pleasure, the bank may invoke the dismissal at pleasure defense to lawsuits
arising from the dismissals.- 'Z
The court then turned its attention to the bank's by-laws, which provided
that the Chairman of the Board, or his designee, may remove officers and
employees of the bank." 3 The court found that the Chairman of the Board
or his designee had not discharged the named plaintiffs in Mahoney. Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that the bank did not comply with the
requirements of the National Bank Act, and therefore could not assert the
National Bank Act as a defense."' The Mahoney court opined:
Congress specifically states that boards of directors have the power to
dismiss officers at pleasure. This Court has interpreted this authorization
of power to apply to boards of directors and to those persons to whom
the boards assign dismissal powers. A dismissal at pleasure must be
accomplished in the manner in which Congress empowers that it can be
made. When Congress gives power, the proper exercise of that power is
bound by any limitations set forth by the Congress, and here Congress
has so limited the exercise of that power. Section 24, Fifth and Sixth must
108. 571 F. Supp. at 289-90. Article VI, Section 1 of the Crocker National Bank by-laws
provided: "Senior officers shall be appointed by the Board of Directors and other officers may
be appointed by the Board of Directors or the Chairman of the Board or by such person or
persons as the Board may designate." Id.
109. Id.
110. 571 F. Supp. at 290-92.
Ill. Id. at 290-91. See supra note 107.
112. Id. at 291.
113. 571 F. Supp. at 291.
114. Id. at 290. Article IV, Section 3, of Crocker National Bank's by-laws provided: "The
Chairman of the Board, or such person or persons as he may desinate, may ... remove officers
and employees of the association, other than senior officers." Id.
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be read together as authorizing dismissals of officers at pleausre only by
boards of directors and those to whom the boards assign the performance
of the dismissal of officers. Congress did not authorize that any others
could dismiss officers at pleasure.-3
Less than one week later, the Sixth Circuit applied similar reasoning and
refused to dismiss a complaint brought by a former branch manager of a
national bank in Wiskotoni v. Michigan National Bank-West."16 Wiskotoni
was discharged after bank officials allegedly learned that he had been
involved in the "numbers rackets.""' Although Wiskotoni denied the alle-
gation and offered to take a polygraph test, the bank denied him the
opportunity to take the test and he was subsequently discharged." 8 The
plaintiff brought an action against the bank for breach of implied contract
and for violation of Michigan public policy." 9 The bank moved to dismiss
the complaint contending that the National Bank Act preempted Michigan
law. 20 The Wiskotoni court, however, held that the plaintiff was not an
"officer" as defined by the National Bank Act because he was neither
appointed nor dismissed by the bank's board of directors.' 2'
The bank's by-laws in Wiskotoni provided that branch managers of the
bank were "officers."' 22 The Wiskotoni court held, however, that such a
designation by the bank's by-laws was not dispositive 2 3 The court concluded
that the plaintiff was not an officer of the bank for purposes of the National
Bank Act because he was not appointed and discharged by the bank's board
of directors. 24 However, the majority did not address the issue of whether
the bank's board of directors could assign the task of appointing and
discharging branch managers to officers of the bank. 25
115. Id. at 291. (emphasis in original).
116. 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983).
117. Id. at 381.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 387.
121. Id.
122. Id. Section 4.5 of the by-laws of the Michigan National Bank provided:
Other officers. The board of directors may appoint one or more assistant vice
presidents, one or more trust officers, one or more assistant secretaries, one or more
assistant cashiers, one or more managers and assistant managers of branches and
such other officers and attorneys in fact as from time to time may be required or
desirable to transact the business of the association. Such officers shall respectively
exercise such powers and perform such duties as pertain to their several offices, or
as may be conferred upon, or assigned to, them by the board of directors, the
chairperson of the board, or the president.
Id.
123. 716 F.2d at 387.
124. Id.
125. Judge Wellford authored the dissenting opinion and argued that the bank's by-laws
granted the president authority to appoint and dismiss bank officers. Judge Wellford concluded
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The Oregon Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in McWhorter
v. First Interstate Bank. 26 In McWhorter, a terminated vice-president/branch
manager brought an action against his former employer for breach of implied
and express contract, outrageous conduct, and deceit. 2 7 The Oregon Court
of Appeals cited Wiskotoni and held that the bank could not raise the
National Bank Act as a defense because the bank's board of directors did
not approve the dismissal of the plaintiff.28
Likewise, the court in McWhorter avoided addressing the issue of the
delegation of authority to appoint and dismiss officers. Without citing
Mahoney, the court noted that the Wiskotoni opinion did not address the
delegation issue. 29 Nevertheless, the McWhorter court, "assum[ed]" that the
authority to appoint and dismiss officers was delegable, and thereby avoided
this issue, and ruled that there was "nothing in this record that would allow
us to conclude either that the power was delegated or that it was lawfully
delegated." 30
Recently, in Alfano v. First National Bank of Highland,'3 the New York
Supreme Court finessed the issue of whether the appointment and dismissal
of an officer by the board of directors of a bank are necessary prerequisites
to use the National Bank Act as a defense to a wrongful discharge claim.
Without specifically discussing this issue, the Alfano court merely concluded
that the plaintiff had been appointed and dismissed by the bank's board of
directors. 132
CONCLUSION
Judicial thought continues to ebb and flow in the wrongful discharge area.
For many years, employers could terminate employees at-will. Recently, the
judiciary has entered the employer-employee relations arena and has at-
tempted to tip the scales of justice in the employee's favor. Although the
Mahoney- Wiskotoni-McWhorter-Alfano cases leave many questions unan-
swered, they clearly demonstrate the judiciary's desire to erode the employ-
ment at-will rule through strict statutory construction of the Bank Acts.
Questions still remain concerning the extent of the judicial limitations de-
veloped by Mahoney and its progeny. Issues such as the ability of a bank's
board of directors to delegate authority to appoint and dismiss covered
that "[t]he Bank's Board acted through the Bank president in hiring and firing Wiskotoni;
Wiskotoni should be deemed an 'officer' within the meaning of the Act; he occupied a position
of responsibility and discretion." Id. at 396.
126. 67 Or. App. 435, 678 P.2d 766 (1984).
127. Id. at 437, 678 P.2d at 767.
128. Id. at 439, 678 P.2d at 768-9.
129. Id. at 439 n.3, 678 P.2d at 768 n.3.
130. Id. at 439, 678 P.2d at 768-9.
131. 490 N.Y.S.2d 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
132. Id. at 58.
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employees remain unanswered.' Also unclear is the level in a bank's hier-
archy that an employee must occupy to fall within the purview of the bank's
dismissal at-will authority.'34 Furthermore, courts still wrestle with the issue
of which common law causes of action, such as emotional distress, interfer-
ence with contractual relations, and fraud, the Bank Acts preempt.3,
Nevertheless, banks covered by any of the Bank Acts should ensure that
their board of directors effectuate all employee appointments and dismissals
covered under the "dismissal at pleasure" sections, or ensure that these
duties are assigned to individuals clearly vested with authority under the
bank's articles or by-laws. Absent such precautions, covered banks could be
exposed to increasing liability in wrongful discharge lawsuits.
133. See Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378, 396 (6th Cir. 1983);
McWhorter v. First Interstate Bank, 67 Or. App. 435, 678 P.2d 766, 768-69 (1984).
134. See supra note 65.
135. See Alexander v. American Nat'l Bank, No. 149703 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Barbara
County Mar. 14, 1984). In an unpublished decision, the court partially granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment under the National Bank Act and dismissed plaintiff's cause of
action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and sex
discrimination. The court, however, denied defendant's motion for summary judgment with
respect to causes of action for emotional distress and loss of consortium to the extent these
causes of action were "based upon the wrongful conduct of defendant at the time the termination
took place." The Alexander court held in this regard:
It is inconceivable that Congress intended that the National Bank Act would relieve
a Bank from responsibility from the tortious acts committed by its agents on the
occasion of an officer's formal termination of her employment. It seems certain that
defendants would not contend that a battery committed upon a terminated officer
would be an activity protected by the National Bank Act. While not as dramatic as
a battery, the torts alleged are distinct and have no relation to the Bank's decision
to terminate plaintiff's employment.
See also supra note 81; Rohse v. First Deposit Nat'l Bank, 497 A.2d 1214 (N.H. 1985) (National
Bank Act permits fired bank officers to sue former employer for deceit or misrepresentation
related to their contract negotiations as bank officers).

